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The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
THE NEED FOR REFORM IN THE AGE OF 
FINANCIAL CHAOS  
INTRODUCTION  
Congress enacted The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA) in 1977 to achieve the balanced goal of eliminating the 
most abusive practices of the debt collection industry without 
unduly restricting the rights of “ethical debt collectors.”1 
Unfortunately, more than three decades later, consumers are still 
regularly subjected to many of the same coercive debt collection 
tactics that Congress originally intended to eradicate. Reports 
compiled by regulators and major news outlets reveal that abusive 
debt collectors still exploit financially distressed consumers with 
repetitive profanity-filled telephone calls,2 intentional harassment 
at work,3 threats of arrest,4 and threats of physical violence.5 These 
  
 1 S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 1-3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 
1696-98. 
The committee has found that debt collection abuse by third party debt 
collectors is a widespread and serious national problem. Collection abuse takes 
many forms, including obscene or profane language, threats of violence, 
telephone calls at unreasonable hours, misrepresentation of a consumer’s legal 
rights, disclosing a consumer’s personal affairs to friends, neighbors, or an 
employer, obtaining information about a consumer through false pretense, 
impersonating public officials and attorneys, and simulating legal process. 
Id. Note, the FDCPA applies only to third-party debt collectors or debt buyers and does 
not regulate the practices of original creditors. Id. at 3. 
 2 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Annual Report 2010: Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act 6 (2010) [hereinafter FTC Annual Report 2010], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
2010/04/P104802fdcpa2010annrpt.pdf. 
 3 Id. at 8; see Dateline NBC: Debt Trap; A Look Inside the Consumer Credit 
Debt Problem in America (NBC television broadcast Sept. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Dateline 
NBC: Debt Trap] (interviewing Iraq War veteran Charles Houston about debt 
collector’s threat to report a seven-year old debt to his military supervisors) (transcript 
available at 2009 WLNR 17592156). 
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tactics are predatory and have caused some consumers to flee their 
homes in fear,6 sign over their property to debt collectors in 
desperation,7 and even commit suicide.8  
Although anecdotal stories of egregious debt collection 
practices recur perpetually in the news,9 the current ubiquity of 
debt collection abuse is not merely a media-fomented perception. 
The annual number of FDCPA lawsuits filed by consumers 
increased by more than 250 percent between 2007 and 2010.10 
Likewise, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—the regulatory 
agency currently tasked with administrative enforcement of the 
FDCPA11—is fielding a growing number of complaints from 
consumers who allege they are victims of abusive debt 
collectors.12 The financial crisis of 2008, the slow economic 
recovery, the lingering high unemployment rate, the high 
  
 4 FTC ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 2, at 7; see Dateline NBC: Debt 
Trap, supra note 3 (playing phone message of debt collector asking debtor, “[d]o you 
want to go to the big house?”). 
 5 FTC ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 2, at 6; see Dateline NBC: Debt 
Trap, supra note 3 (playing answering machine message of a debt collector asking a 
debtor threateningly if she had “ever been raped”). 
 6 Dateline NBC: Debt Trap, supra note 3 (interview with Texas couple who 
fled their home after receiving a call from a debt collector who stated that he had 
secured a warrant from law enforcement to forcibly enter the couple’s home). 
 7  In 2010, a Pennsylvania debt collection agency hired fake police officers to 
visit debtors’ houses and serve them with fake subpoenas. Martha Neil, Debt Collector 
Faked Court Hearings to Trick Consumers into Paying Up, Says AG’s Suit, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 
1, 2010, 12:50 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/debt_collector_faked_court_ 
hearings_to_trick_consumers_into_paying_up_says_. Debtors were then ordered to 
attend mock court proceedings held at the debt collection agency’s offices, where they 
were told by an employee dressed as a judge to make payments by signing over 
personal property or face imprisonment. Id. 
 8  My9 News: Illegal Debt Collectors Push Woman to Commit Suicide (My9 
News television broadcast) (describing a suicide note left by a Tennessee woman who 
was humiliated by a debt collector), available at http://anthonylemons.blogspot.com/ 
2008/04/illegal-debt-collectors-push-woman-to.html (video embedded in WAKE UP U.S. 
blog posting on Apr. 12, 2008). 
 9 Stories of debt collection abuse were commonly reported even before the Great 
Recession of 2008. See, e.g., William J. Holstein, Personal Business; Consumer Tools for 
Holding Bill Collectors at Bay, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/ 
20/business/personal-business-consumer-tools-for-holding-bill-collectors-at-bay.html; Sana 
Siwolop, Spending It; Nasty Calls at 6 A.M.: Dunners Who Go Too Far, N.Y. TIMES, July 
14, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/14/business/spending-it-nasty-calls-at-6-am-
dunners-who-go-too-far.html?src=pm. 
 10 One source reported that consumers filed 4372, 6025, 9365, and 11,395 
FDCPA lawsuits, in 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively. Jack Gordon, The Harsh 
Truth: You Do Not Have to Violate FDCPA in Order to Be Sued Under It, WEBRECON, 
https://www.webrecon.com/b/homepage/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2011). Other sources have 
reported different totals, but still indicate a sharp increase in consumer litigation. See 
Darren Waggoner, More Than 500 Lawsuits Against Agencies, Creditors, CARDLINE, 
Jan. 7, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 360699. 
 11  See infra Part I.B. 
 12 FTC ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
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consumer default rate, and the increased motivation of banks 
and credit card companies to sell off delinquent accounts to 
third-party debt collectors are all interrelated factors that have 
fueled a growing and increasingly aggressive debt collection 
industry.13 Consequently, debt collection abuse has become an 
unavoidable reality for many consumers as they endeavor to 
navigate both short- and long-term financial setbacks in a 
downed economy.14  
The Federal Trade Commission has taken notice.15 In 
recent years, the FTC commissioned multiple workshop panels 
of regulators, consumer rights attorneys, and debt collection 
industry representatives, in order to evaluate the efficacy of 
consumer protection in the debt collection markets.16 As a 
result of its findings, the FTC has recommended a number of 
reforms aimed at bolstering consumer protection—including 
legislative amendments to the FDCPA that would require debt 
collectors to provide consumers with more detailed disclosure of 
debts, and to better inform consumers of their statutory rights 
under the FDCPA.17 But while the FTC’s careful evaluation of 
the debt collection industry provides a positive starting point 
for enhancing regulatory protection, the reforms it has 
proposed will not do enough to adequately remedy the statute’s 
greatest shortcomings. 
The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Jerman v. 
Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA18 demonstrates 
that FDCPA’s fundamental flaw is its failure to punish debt 
collection abuses in proportion to the actual harm they do to 
consumers.19 In other words, Jerman illustrates that debt 
collectors who commit severe consumer abuses and those who 
commit technical violations are essentially punished equally 
under the FDCPA’s very limited private cause of action 
provisions.20 Consequently, consumers who are harassed, 
  
 13 See infra Part III.A. 
 14  See infra Part III.A. 
 15  See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n, Repairing a Broken System: Protecting 
Consumers in Debt Collection Litigation and Arbitration (2010) [hereinafter FTC, 
Repairing a Broken System]; Fed. Trade Comm’n, Collecting Consumer Debts: The 
Challenges of Change (2009) [hereinafter FTC, The Challenges of Change]. 
 16  See FTC, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 15, at I; FTC, THE 
CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, supra note 15, at i. 
 17  FTC, THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, supra note 15, at 26-30. 
 18  130 S. Ct. 1605 (2010). 
 19  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 20 The FDCPA enables individuals to sue for statutory damages not to exceed 
a maximum of $1000. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A) (2006). Alternatively, consumers may 
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deceived, and threatened by debt collectors lack the collective 
might needed to eliminate the offenders’ profit motives through 
private enforcement.21 Moreover, because many of the FDCPA’s 
provisions remain outdated, ambiguous, and unsettled in the 
courts, the statute has enabled attorneys to sue otherwise 
compliant debt collectors for mundane technical violations that 
cause consumers no actual harm.22 This regulatory inefficiency 
deleteriously affects both consumers and debt collectors 
because it conflates substantive consumer abuses with 
technical compliance violations, thereby diverting private 
enforcement efforts away from prosecuting the truly harmful 
consumer abuses that Congress initially sought to eliminate.  
In order to reclaim the FDCPA as an effective vanguard of 
consumer protection, regulators must give it the power to 
fundamentally reshape the debt collection market by eliminating 
the profit motive underlying egregious debt collection abuses. It 
must be retooled to destroy the competitive advantage that 
unethical debt collectors gain through abusive tactics, while 
allowing ethical debt collectors to profit through compliance and 
capture greater market share. Accordingly, this note argues that 
optimal FDCPA reform must meet the balanced goal of better 
protecting debtors by providing tougher regulation against 
egregious debt collection abuses, while benefiting ethical debt 
collectors by clarifying existing statutory ambiguities and 
providing the regulatory guidance needed to lawfully integrate 
emerging technologies into their business models. In sum, 
compliance must be made easier and more profitable than abuse 
in order to affect positive industry-wide reform.  
Part I of this note provides background information on 
the FDCPA, discusses its provisions, and examines its intended 
enforcement mechanisms. Part II examines the FDCPA’s bona 
fide error defense and the recent Supreme Court decision of 
Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA as a 
critical lens to identify the path to effective reform. Part III 
discusses the FDCPA’s increasing importance as a regulatory 
vehicle during America’s period of economic recovery. It also 
examines the profit motives of the debt collectors who engage 
in abusive practices—as well as the motives of the consumer 
  
sue under the class action provision of the FDCPA, which allows class action plaintiffs 
to recover cumulative damages of up to $500,000 or one percent of the offending debt 
collector’s net worth, whichever amount is less. Id. § 1692k(a)(2)(B). 
 21  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 22  See infra Part IV. 
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attorneys who file lawsuits against them—in order to 
conceptualize how a revised FDCPA can more efficiently direct 
the market behavior of debt collectors and consumer rights 
attorneys towards the goal of eradicating egregious debt 
collection abuse. Part IV presents specific examples of how debt 
collectors commonly incur liability due to technicalities 
predicated on the outdated provisions and statutory 
ambiguities of the FDCPA. This section demonstrates that debt 
collectors’ violations of the FDCPA are not always a product of 
unethical conduct, but rather a result of their uncertainty 
regarding how to correctly interpret the statute’s contradictory 
provisions. Finally, Part V will propose specific FDCPA reforms 
that offer enhanced protection to consumers, punish egregious 
violators more extensively, and provide compliant debt 
collectors with a more standardized collection procedure to help 
immunize them to technical lawsuits. I suggest that 
interagency collaboration between the FTC and the newly 
created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) may 
provide the ideal avenue to implement evolving regulations.  
I. THE FDCPA: BACKGROUND AND ENFORCEMENT 
The FDCPA is at a crossroads: it can be revamped and 
improved as a prophylactic against consumer abuse or it can 
remain ineffective, to the detriment of both debt collectors and 
consumers alike. In order to better illuminate the path towards 
effective FDCPA reforms, this section provides background 
information on the statute and provides an overview of its 
relevant provisions. This section also analyzes the strengths and 
weaknesses of the FDCPA’s current enforcement mechanisms.  
A. Creation and Relevant Provisions 
Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 to protect 
consumers from widespread abuses in the debt collection 
industry.23 Specifically, Congress found that some debt 
collectors commonly used harassing phone calls, profanity, 
threats of imprisonment, and threats of violence, as well as 
other fraudulent, deceptive, and misleading collection practices 
  
 23 S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696. 
Congress limited the FDCPA in scope, however, to regulate third-party debt collectors 
only; therefore, the statute has no regulatory effect on original holders of consumer 
debt. Id. at 3. 
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to prey on consumers in financial distress.24 Congress also 
believed that enforcement efforts against abusive debt 
collectors would help ethical debt collectors by eliminating the 
abusers’ unfair competitive advantage.25 Accordingly, it crafted 
the FDCPA with the intention that it would precisely target 
the worst abusers for punishment, while allowing ethical debt 
collectors to flourish in a fair marketplace.26  
Substantively, the act imposes many requirements on 
debt collectors and it partially outlines both necessary and 
prohibited conduct. First, the act regulates debt collectors’ 
communications with debtors27 and with the third-party 
associates of debtors.28 It specifically prohibits debt collectors 
from contacting debtors between the hours of 9:00pm and 
8:00am,29 and prohibits contact “at any unusual time or 
place . . . which should be known to be inconvenient” to the 
debtor.30 The act also partially restricts contact at a debtor’s 
place of employment and provides that all attempts to contact a 
debtor must cease once the debt collector learns the debtor is 
represented by an attorney.31 The FDCPA allows debt collectors 
to contact third parties, such as the family or friends of a 
debtor, only for the limited purpose of ascertaining the location 
  
 24 Id. at 1. 
The committee has found that debt collection abuse by third party debt 
collectors is a widespread and serious national problem. Collection abuse takes 
many forms, including obscene or profane language, threats of violence, 
telephone calls at unreasonable hours, misrepresentation of a consumer’s legal 
rights, disclosing a consumer’s personal affairs to friends, neighbors, or an 
employer, obtaining information about a consumer through false pretense, 
impersonating public officials and attorneys, and simulating legal process. 
Id. 
 25 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 805, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2006) (“It is 
the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt 
collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt 
collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent 
State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”).  
 26 See id. Congress believed that there were relatively few bad debt collectors 
who perpetrated the majority of consumer abuse; see S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2 (1977), 
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696 (“While unscrupulous debt collectors 
comprise only a small segment of the industry, the suffering and anguish which they 
regularly inflict is substantial.”). 
 27 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 805, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a) (2006). 
 28 Id. § 1692c(b). 
 29 Id. § 1692c(a)(1). 
 30 Id. Debt collectors are not allowed to contact debtors at their places of 
employment if the debt collector “knows or has reason to know that the [debtor’s] 
employer prohibits the [debtor] from receiving such communication.” Id. § 1692c(a)(3). 
 31 Id. § 1692c(a)(2)-(3). 
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of a debtor,32 but it clearly prohibits debt collectors from 
informing third parties that the debtor actually owes a debt.33 
After the debt collector initially contacts the debtor, the debtor 
has the power to terminate any further communications with 
the debt collector by informing the debt collector in writing that 
he or she refuses to pay the debt or no longer wishes to be 
contacted in connection with collection of the debt.34  
In addition to regulating communications with the 
debtor, the FDCPA broadly prohibits any conduct by a debt 
collector that constitutes harassment or abuse.35 Debt collectors 
are prohibited from, among other conduct, making threats, 
using obscenity, repeatedly telephoning the debtor with the 
intent to harass, publishing the debt, or failing to state one’s 
identity as a debt collector when communicating with the 
debtor.36 The FDCPA also prohibits debt collectors from using 
specific threats, such as threatening to have the debtor 
arrested, threatening to reveal the debt to others, threatening 
to damage a debtor’s reputation, and threatening the debtor 
with physical violence.37  
The FDCPA also prohibits debt collectors from making 
any false or misleading representations in connection with the 
collection of a debt.38 It specifically but nonexclusively defines a 
misrepresentation as “[t]he false representation of (A) the 
character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or (B) any 
services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully 
  
 32 Id. § 1692b. The act also provides that debt collectors seeking location 
information from a third-party must identify themselves by name and also indicate 
their employer if asked, but they must not indicate that they are seeking the 
information to collect a debt. Id.  
 33 Id. § 1692c(b). The FDCPA makes a clear distinction between contacting a 
third-party to collect the location information of a debtor and contacting a third-party 
regarding the repayment of the underlying debt itself. Unless the debt collector is 
seeking location information or has express permission of the debtor, it “may not 
communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than 
the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, 
the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.” Id. 
 34 Id. § 1692c(c). The statute provides an exception allowing a debt collector 
to make further contact with the debtor to inform the debtor that further collection 
efforts will cease, or to inform the debtor that it intends to invoke a “specified remedy” 
against the debtor. Id. 
 35 Id. § 1692d. The statue contains broad language prohibiting all conduct by 
debt collectors “the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any 
person in connection with the collection of a debt.” Id. 
 36 Id. § 1692d(1)-(6). 
 37 Id. § 1692d(1). 
 38 Id. § 1692e. 
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received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt.”39 This 
provision protects debtors from debt collectors who add 
unlawful collection fees and interest charges onto the principal 
debt or who unlawfully threaten to invoke legal remedies that 
have expired due to the statute of limitations.40 The FDCPA 
also makes it illegal for a debt collector to falsely identify 
himself as an official or attorney, to misrepresent the availability 
and nature of legal remedies the debt collector intends to take 
against the debtor,41 and to falsely imply that a debtor has 
committed a crime through virtue of non-payment.42 In particular, 
section 1692e(10) broadly prohibits, “[t]he use of any false 
representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect 
any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.”43 
The FDCPA also requires debt collectors to inform 
debtors about certain rights that they possess under the act. 
Within five days of its initial contact with the debtor, the debt 
collector must notify the debtor of his or her right to dispute 
the debt.44 The debt collector must—in a clear and 
understandable manner that does not understate or 
overshadow the debtor’s rights to dispute the debt—inform the 
debtor that he or she must dispute the debt within thirty days 
from receipt of the notice, or else the debt collector will assume 
it to be valid.45 Additionally, the debt collector must advise the 
debtor that if he or she disputes the debt writing, then the debt 
collector is required to obtain and mail a verification of the debt 
to the debtor.46 Accordingly, if a debtor disputes a debt in writing, 
the FDCPA requires that the debt collector verify it with the 
original creditor before proceeding with its collections efforts.47 
Debt collectors are also required to include a warning48 in its 
initial contact with the debtor—regardless of whether the contact 
is oral or written—stating that the purpose of the contact is to 
  
 39 Id. § 1692e(2). 
 40 Id.; Lauren Goldberg, Note, Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of 
Debt Collection After FDCPA, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 711, 749-50 (2006). 
 41 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3), (5). 
 42 Id. § 1692e(7). 
 43 Id. § 1692e(10). 
 44 Id. § 1692g(a). 
 45 Id. § 1692g(a)(3). 
 46 Id. § 1692g(a)(4). 
 47  Id. § 1692g(b). 
 48 This requirement is commonly referred to as the FDCPA’s “Mini-Miranda” 
warning. Leahey v. Franklin Collection Serv., Inc., No. 2:09-cv-00709-AKK, 2010 WL 
5279831, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2010). 
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collect a debt, and that any and all information gathered by the 
debt collector from the debtor will be used for that purpose.49  
In addition to misrepresentation, the FDCPA also 
targets unfair debt collection practices.50 For example, the 
statute provides regulations regarding the debt collector’s 
handling of post-dated checks and prohibits debt collectors 
from threatening to repossess property without proper legal 
standing and the actual intent to take such action against the 
debtor.51 The statute also prohibits creditors from using 
deceptive forms,52 such as collection letters that use the 
letterhead of an uninvolved debt collector to create the 
impression that an uninvolved third-party is aiding in collection 
of debt.53 The aforementioned provisions of the FDCPA are not 
an exhaustive statement of its protections, but they are the most 
relevant to this note because they give rise to the most frequent 
violations of the statute and are in need of reform.54  
B.  Enforcement Mechanisms  
The primary enforcement mechanism of the FDCPA is 
shared between its private cause of action provision and the 
administrative enforcement powers of the FTC.55 The FDCPA 
  
 49 § 1692e(11): 
The failure to disclose in the initial written communication with the consumer 
and, in addition, if the initial communication with the consumer is oral, in that 
initial oral communication, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt 
and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, and the failure 
to disclose in subsequent communications that the communication is from a 
debt collector, except that this paragraph shall not apply to a formal pleading 
made in connection with a legal action. 
Id. 
 50 Id. § 1692f. “A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means 
to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” Id. 
 51 Id. § 1692f(1)-(6). 
 52 Id. § 1692j. 
 53 S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 5 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699. 
 54 See FTC ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 2, at 6-10. 
 55 15 U.S.C. § 1692k-l (2006); Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & 
Ulrich L.P.A., 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1609 (2010). Technically, seven other agencies have 
limited enforcement powers under the FDCPA, specific to the industries they regulate. 
These agencies include the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal 
Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, the National Credit Union Administration, the Department of 
Transportation, and the Department of Agriculture. 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(b) (2006). 
However: 
Almost all of the collectors these agencies regulate are creditors collecting on 
their own debts, and, as such, largely fall outside the Act’s coverage. If these 
agencies receive complaints about debt collection firms that are not under their 
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creates a private cause of action which enables individuals to 
sue for any actual damages sustained due to a debt collector’s 
violations, and for statutory damages not to exceed a maximum 
of $1000.56 Alternatively, consumers may sue under the class 
action provision of the FDCPA, which allows class action 
plaintiffs to recover cumulative damages of up to $500,000 or 
one percent of the offending debt collector’s net worth, whichever 
amount is less.57 Further, a successful plaintiff is entitled to 
costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.58 Importantly, FDCPA is a 
strict liability statute—a private plaintiff need not allege or 
prove any actual harm resulting from a debt collector’s violation 
of the statute in order to be awarded statutory damages.59 
The FTC describes its current responsibilities as the 
administrative agency that oversees the FDCPA as threefold: 
enforcement, education, and research/policy initiatives.60 The 
FTC collects and monitors consumer complaints in an attempt 
to identify debt collectors engaging in large-scale patterns of 
abuse.61 If the pattern is large enough to warrant agency action, 
  
jurisdiction, they generally forward the complaints to the FTC or suggest that 
the consumer contact the FTC directly. 
FTC ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 2, at 1 n.2. 
 56 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 57 Id. § 1692k(a)(2)(B). 
 58 Id. § 1692k(a)(3). This provision also allows the court to award the defendant 
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs where a plaintiff brings an action in “bad faith and 
for the purpose of harassment.” Id. Absent this requisite showing, however, the court may 
not impose attorney’s fees or costs in favor of the defendant merely because the defendant 
prevailed on the merits of the claim. Rouse v. Law Offices of Rory Clark, 603 F.3d 699, 
705 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[I]nsulating consumers from the prospect of paying defendants’ costs 
by requiring a finding that the action was brought in bad faith and for harassment is 
consistent with the stated intent of Congress.”). 
 59 See Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(“In order to prevail, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to show that she herself was confused 
by the communication she received; it is sufficient for a plaintiff to demonstrate that the 
least sophisticated consumer would be confused.”); Rosemary E. Williams, Proof Under the 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, in 104 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 66 (2008). 
 60 FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2009: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 
PRACTICES ACT 10-17 (2009) [hereinafter FTC ANNUAL REPORT 2009], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P094804fdcpareport.pdf. The FTC also retains the power 
to issue advisory opinions and staff commentaries, although the agency rarely makes 
use of these powers, having issued only four advisory opinions since the FDCPA was 
passed in 1977 and having issued its only formal staff commentary in 1988. Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act Links, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fdcpajump.shtm 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2011). 
 61 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(a) (2006); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-748, Fair 
Debt Collect Practices Act Could Better Reflect the Evolving Debt Collection Marketplace 
and Use of Technology 14 (2009) [hereinafter GAO, Evolving Debt Collection Marketplace]. 
[The] FDCPA and the FTC Act provide [the] FTC with enforcement authority to 
investigate debt collection agencies it believes may be violating the law . . . . [If 
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the FTC will typically investigate the debt collector’s activities, 
and if violations are confirmed, it will contact the debt collector 
directly to negotiate a settlement.62 If negotiations fail to yield a 
settlement, the FTC can file a lawsuit in federal court directly 
through its own attorneys or it can request that the 
Department of Justice file suit on its behalf.63 The FTC’s power 
to bring civil lawsuits against debt collectors is a combined 
function of § 1692(l) of the FDCPA64 and § 45 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act.65 This gives the FTC a key advantage 
in its litigation efforts against debt collectors because it is not 
subject to the same statutory damage limitations as are private 
plaintiffs. The FTC can seek damages in the amount of $16,000 
for each violation committed by the debt collector, and it can 
request injunctive relief—a remedy that can severely paralyze 
a debt collector’s operations.66 Consequently, the FTC can 
harness its leverage to settle the majority of its enforcement 
efforts without litigation and enjoys a high success rate against 
the debt collectors it targets.67 The disadvantage is that the 
agency handles only a few cases each year—typically less than 
five—which allows many smaller abusive debt collectors to 
escape its enforcement efforts.68  
The FTC also lacks any rulemaking authority with respect 
to the FDCPA, which means it cannot promulgate binding 
regulations.69 Instead, the FTC must submit an annual report to 
Congress to summarize its regulatory actions.70 Consequently, 
  
the] FTC’s investigation reveals violations of either act, the agency can file suit 
in federal court for injunctive relief to prevent further violations and seek 
restitution for consumers and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains by the collector. 
Id. 
 62 GAO, Evolving Debt Collection Marketplace, supra note 61, at 14; Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Re: Twenty-First Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 815(a) 
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (1999) (“If an investigation reveals evidence of 
continuing FDCPA violations, staff contacts the debt collector and attempts to negotiate a 
settlement before recommending that the Commission issue a complaint.”), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fdcpa/senate99.shtm. 
 63 FTC ANNUAL REPORT 2009, supra note 60, at 10-11. 
 64 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(a); Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich 
LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1609 (2010). 
 65 15 § U.S.C. 1692l(a); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609 (2010). 
 66 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A), (C); 74 Fed. Reg. 857, 858 (2009) (amending 16 
C.F.R. § 1.98(d) to provide for a $16,000 civil penalty under 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A)); 
Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609. 
 67 See Williams, supra note 59, at § 3. 
 68 FTC, THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, supra note 15, app.B at B-1 to B-3 
(listing enforcement actions from 1977 through 2008); see Williams, supra note 59, at § 3. 
 69 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(d). 
 70 Id. § 1692m. 
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like many government agencies, a portion of the FTC’s resources 
is devoted to perpetually justifying its efforts.71 This may 
incentivize the FTC to focus on a few headline-grabbing 
enforcement efforts that will be deemed impressive in an annual 
congressional report, rather than cast its enforcement net widely 
to ensnare abuses perpetrated by smaller collectors.72 
Another key difference between the FTC’s enforcement 
powers and the enforcement powers of private plaintiffs under 
the FDCPA is that the FTC cannot sue debt collectors for their 
inadvertent technical violations of the statute.73 Because the 
FTC’s ability to sue is set forth in the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, the agency may only sue debt collectors who 
engage in “unfair or deceptive” trade practices “with actual 
knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective 
circumstances that such act is unfair or deceptive and is 
prohibited . . . .”74 This requirement acts as a filter that directs 
the FTC’s enforcement efforts towards egregious abuse. 
II. JERMAN V. CARLISLE, MCNELLIE, RINI, KRAMER & 
ULRICH L.P.A.: A CRITICAL LENS FOR EFFECTIVE FDCPA 
REFORM 
While the FDCPA provisions discussed in Part I provide 
some measure of protection to consumers, the private 
enforcement mechanism’s strict liability component provides no 
practical differentiation between the most egregious consumer 
abuses and mundane technical violations that do not cause 
consumers any actual harm.75 This private regulatory model is 
inefficient because abusive debt collectors gain a competitive 
advantage from their coercive tactics. To eliminate that 
incentive, abusive debt collectors should be exposed to more 
severe penalties under the FDCPA than technical violators, 
  
 71 See James Fanto, We’re All Capitalists Now: The Importance of Nature, 
Provision and Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105, 157 
(1998) (describing the SEC’s investor education initiatives as an attempt to engage in 
the “often-used strategy of regulatory agencies justifying their existence by 
dramatizing an issue that demands their regulatory intervention”). 
 72 Id. 
 73 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A). 
 74 Id. 
 75 The exception is that where an egregious abuse actually causes harm to a 
consumer, it allows that consumer to recover in full for his or her injuries. Id. § 1692k(a)(1). 
For the technical violations, however, no harm is actually done to the consumer, so statutory 
damages, costs, and attorney’s fees are the practical limit to damages. 
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who do not benefit from their inadvertent violations.76 This section 
examines how the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense was originally 
intended to distinguish between abusive debt collectors and those 
who sought to comply with the statute in good faith, and how in 
the wake of Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich 
LPA, this important distinction has become blurred.  
A. The FDCPA’s Bona Fide Error Defense  
The FDCPA was drafted to purposefully differentiate 
between abusive debt collectors and debt collectors who acted 
in good faith to comply with the statute. Specifically, § 1692k(c) 
was intended to preserve this fundamental distinction by 
providing that if a debt collector demonstrated by a 
preponderance of the evidence that its violation of the FDCPA 
resulted “from a bona fide error notwithstanding the 
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any 
such error,” it would not be held liable for its violation of the 
statute.77 As the total number of new lawsuits filed by debtors 
under the FDCPA increased,78 debt collectors heavily relied 
upon the bona fide error provision as an affirmative defense.79 
Debt collectors sought to apply this defense not only to 
mistakes of fact, such as misstating the amount of money owed 
by a debtor,80 but also mistakes of law, such as using 
noncompliant language in the written communications with 
the debtor.81 As the “bona fide error” defense became a 
commonly litigated issue in FDCPA lawsuits, a split in 
authority among the federal circuit courts emerged as to 
  
 76 See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L.P.A., 130 S. Ct. 
1605, 1633 (2010) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“A debt collector does not gain a 
competitive advantage by making good-faith legal errors any more than by making 
good-faith factual errors.”). 
 77 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2006). 
 78 See infra Part III.A. 
 79 For some notable examples of defendants invoking the bona fide error defense, 
see Edwards v. Niagara Credit Solutions, Inc., 584 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009); Ruth v. 
Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790, 794 (7th Cir. 2009); Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 
569 F.3d 606, 610-11 (6th Cir. 2009); Miller v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, 561 F.3d 588, 601 
(6th Cir. 2009); Seeger v. AFNI, Inc., 548 F.3d 1107, 1113-14 (7th Cir. 2008); Midland 
Funding L.L.C. v. Brent, 644 F. Supp. 2d 961, 970-72 (N.D. Ohio 2009); Drossin v. Nat’l 
Action Fin. Servs., Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
 80 See, e.g., Hartman, 569 F.3d at 610-11. 
 81 See, e.g., Ruth, 577 F.3d at 793-95. 
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whether the defense applied to both errors of fact and law or 
whether it was limited to errors of fact.82  
In Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich 
LPA,83 the Supreme Court held that the bona fide error defense 
applies to mistakes of fact only—narrowing its applicability as 
an affirmative defense and prompting the dissent to raise fears 
that the decision would spur a cottage industry of technical 
lawsuits at the expense of well-intentioned debt collectors 
(many of whom are attorneys).84 Although Jerman resolved the 
bona fide error dispute as a matter of law, it also brought to the 
forefront a fundamental flaw in the FDCPA: the statute—
contrary to its original balanced intentions—unnecessarily 
blurs the distinction between the highly abusive debt collection 
violations it was intended to protect against and purely 
technical violations that do not cause debtors any actual 
harm.85 The following section will examine Jerman as a critical 
lens to identify a path towards effective reform. 
B. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich 
LPA 
On April 17, 2006, the law firm of Carlisle, McNellie, 
Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, served Karen L. Jerman with a 
summons and complaint instituting a foreclosure action for 
allegedly failing to pay her mortgage.86 The law firm also 
served a letter titled “Notice Under the Fair Debt Collections 
Practices Act,” pursuant to § 1692g of the FDCPA.87 Jerman 
subsequently retained an attorney to dispute the debt.88 Her 
attorney contacted the debt collector by letter to inform it that 
the alleged debt was invalid.89 The debt collector then contacted 
its client—the original creditor—and discovered that the client 
had made a mistake; Jerman had in fact paid her mortgage.90 
The debt collector informed Jerman’s attorney that its client 
  
 82 Seeger v. AFNI, Inc., 548 F.3d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir. 2008); Jerman v. 
Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L.P.A., 538 F.3d 469, 473-74 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(recognizing split in authority among the circuits), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1605 (2010); 
Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1121-22 (10th Cir. 2002).  
 83 Jerman, 130 S. Ct. 1605 (2010). 
 84 Id. at 1630-35 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 85 Id. at 1631-32. 
 86 Jerman, 538 F.3d at 471. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
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had made a mistake and promptly submitted a judgment entry 
to the court to dismiss the foreclosure complaint.91  
Jerman then filed a class action lawsuit in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against 
the debt collector, alleging that the debt collector violated the 
FDCPA by using the following language in its validation notice:  
I will assume all portions of this debt to be valid unless 
you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion 
thereof within thirty (30) days of the date you receive 
this letter. If you dispute the validity of this debt, you 
must notify me, in writing, within the time stated, that 
you dispute this debt.92  
Plaintiff argued that a debtor is not required to dispute 
a debt in writing under § 1692g(a)(3), which states simply 
“unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the 
notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, 
the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector.”93 The 
plaintiff argued that the defendants’ validation notice violated 
the FDCPA because it created the impression that contesting 
the debt in writing was the only way to dispute the debt and that 
this was misleading because it foreclosed the possibility that she 
could use other forms of communication to dispute the claim.94  
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that 
the “in writing” language used in the validation notice was not 
a violation of § 1692g(a)(3).95 The district court denied the 
defendants’ motion, holding that the language in the validation 
notice was a violation because it impermissibly overshadowed 
the possibility that plaintiff could invoke her rights through an 
alternative form of communication.96 The debt collector, after 
the conclusion of discovery, filed a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing 
(1) the foreclosure complaint was not an “initial 
communication,” which is necessary before debtor 
“validation rights can be triggered” under the 
FDCPA; (2) Defendants’ alleged mistake as to the 
  
 91 Id.  
 92 Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L.P.A., 464 F. Supp. 
2d 720, 722 (N.D. Ohio 2006). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 721. 
 96 Id. at 724-25. 
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written-dispute requirement was unintentional and 
resulted from a bona fide error; and (3) Defendants 
are absolutely immune from liability because their 
actions represented an “integral part of the judicial 
process.”97  
The district court granted the defendants’ summary 
judgment motion, finding that although the foreclosure notice 
was an initial debt collection communication that violated 
§ 1692g(a)(3), and although the defendants were not entitled to 
absolute immunity as attorneys, the defendants had established 
their entitlement to summary judgment because they had 
proven that their mistake of law was a bona fide error pursuant 
to § 1692k(c).98 The plaintiff subsequently appealed the district 
court’s decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.99 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the plain language 
of § 1692k(c) required that a debt collector show that it 
maintains procedures reasonably calculated to avoid error, and 
that mistakes of law could not be prevented by procedures 
designed to avoid inadvertent factual errors.100 In analyzing the 
plaintiff’s argument, the court looked to the case of Johnson v. 
Riddle,101 to find that a debt collector could establish the 
requisite safeguards and procedures required by the bona fide 
error defense by systematically staying educated and apprised 
of changes in FDCPA law.102 The court also agreed with the 
Tenth Circuit’s analysis in Johnson, which reasoned that the 
legislative history of the FDCPA indicated that its statutory 
language was to have a broad reach, including the statute’s 
affirmative defense provision.103 
Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision, holding that the bona fide error defense is not 
limited to mistakes of fact.104 In June of 2009, the Supreme Court 
of the United States granted plaintiff’s petition for certiorari.105 
  
 97 Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L.P.A., 538 F.3d 469, 
472 (6th Cir. 2008).  
 98 Id. at 471. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 475. 
 101 305 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 102 Jerman, 538 F.3d at 476 (“[T]here is nothing unusual about attorney 
collectors maintaining procedures, such as frequent education and review of the 
FDCPA law, in order to avoid mistakes of law.”).  
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 474-77. 
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1. The Majority’s Decision  
In a majority opinion by Justice Sotomayor, citing the 
age old maxim that “ignorance of the law will not excuse any 
person, either civilly or criminally,” the Court held that the 
FDCPA’s bona fide error defense did not apply to mistakes of 
law.106 The Court found that the plain language of the FDCPA 
did not permit debt collectors to avoid liability for their 
mistakes of law, and where Congress had provided an 
affirmative defense in other acts, it had done so more 
explicitly.107 The Court also reasoned that since § 1692k(c) 
required debt collectors who invoked the bona fide error 
defense to demonstrate proof that they implemented 
“procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error,” the 
legislature did not intend for it to apply to mistakes of law.108 It 
concluded that although a debt collector could adopt procedural 
methods to avoid mistakes in legal reasoning, legal reasoning 
was “not a mechanical or strictly linear process”; therefore, the 
requirement of § 1692k that the debt collector demonstrate 
specific procedures was meant to limit the defense to factual 
and clerical errors only.109 
To support its analysis, the Court examined the history of 
the FDCPA’s statutory analogue—the Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA).110 The Court found that in enacting the FDCPA in 1977, 
Congress copied the bona fide error provision of TILA, which the 
federal courts at the time had held applied only to clerical 
errors.111 The Court reasoned that when Congress adopted the 
FDCPA it intended to give the bona fide error provision a similar 
  
“[T]he plain language of the FDCPA suggests no intent to limit the bona fide 
error defense to clerical errors. To the contrary, § 1692k(c) refers by its terms to 
any ‘error’ that is ‘bona fide.’” The court next looked to legislative history, and 
found “no indication . . . that Congress intended this broad language to mean 
anything other than what it says.” 
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1121 n.14 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
 105 Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L.P.A., 129 S. Ct. 
2863 (2009) (mem.). 
 106 Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L.P.A., 130 S. Ct. 
1605, 1611 (2010) (quoting Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. 404, 411 (1833)).  
 107 Id. at 1612. 
 108 Id. at 1614 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2006)). The Court read the word 
“procedure” in the context of its 1976 dictionary meaning—a “series of steps followed in a 
regular orderly definite way.” Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 109 Id. at 1614-15. 
 110 Id. at 1615-16. 
 111 Id. 
1570 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol.76:4 
import as the bona fide error provision in TILA.112 Additionally, 
although in 1980 Congress amended TILA to expressly exclude 
legal errors, the Court found that this express amendment did not 
imply that Congress intended to distinguish the FDCPA by failing 
to revise it contemporaneously with TILA.113  
Finally, the Court found that the potential adverse 
consequences of its decision were negligible. The possibility 
that limiting the bona fide error defense would cause an 
increase in frivolous FDCPA litigation or create a conflict of 
interest for attorneys did not warrant a disregard for the plain 
textual import of the statute.114 The Court found that debt 
collectors could protect themselves from any potential legal 
uncertainty by requesting an advisory opinion from the FTC 
before taking an uncertain legal position or action, although it 
conceded that the administrative delay in issuing such opinions 
rendered the option better in theory than in practice.115 In 
addition, the Court found that debt collectors were protected 
from frivolous litigation because courts had discretion under 
the statute to award attorneys’ fees and costs to defendants in 
cases where plaintiffs brought frivolous lawsuits, in bad faith, 
to chill lawful collection efforts.116  
2. The Dissent’s Opinion  
In dissent, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito, 
emphasized the negative consequences of allowing debtors to 
sue for highly technical violations of the FDCPA without the 
requirement that the debtor actually sustain any ascertainable 
damages.117 They envisioned a “cottage industry” of attorneys 
generating revenue in the form of mandatory legal fees 
  
 112 Id. at 1616. 
 113 Id. at 1617-18. 
 114 Id. at 1620-24. 
 115 Id. at 1615, 1621. 
 116 Id. at 1620-21. 
 117 Id. at 1629 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
When the law is used to punish good-faith mistakes; when adopting reasonable 
safeguards is not enough to avoid liability; when the costs of discovery and 
litigation are used to force settlement even absent fault or injury; when class-
action suits transform technical legal violations into windfalls for plaintiffs or 
their attorneys, the Court, by failing to adopt a reasonable interpretation to 
counter these excesses, risks compromising its own institutional responsibility 
to ensure a workable and just litigation system. 
Id. 
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predicated on frivolous litigation.118 The dissent also argued 
that a fundamental problem caused by technical FDCPA claims 
is that the very initiation of litigation is generally enough to force 
defendants to settle due to contrast between the relatively low 
statutory awards to which plaintiffs are entitled and the 
relatively high costs associated with defending claims to 
fruition.119 This disparity, in the dissent’s opinion, created a 
perverse incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to manufacture 
tenuous litigation against debt collectors in anticipation of 
settlement.120 By limiting the bona fide error defense to questions 
of fact, the dissent argued that the Court would destroy one of the 
only protections that debt collectors—many of whom are 
attorneys—had to defend against these questionable claims.121 
The dissent also warned that limiting the bona fide 
error defense would impose unrestrained technical statutory 
liability on debt collecting attorneys. This problem, they 
argued, would damage the adversarial legal system by 
imposing personal liability on lawyers who were representing 
their clients’ interests in good faith, because lawyers who 
pursue payments for creditors are treated as third-party debt 
collectors under the FDCPA.122 Specifically, the dissent 
cautioned that the potential liability incurred by debt collecting 
attorneys would have a deleterious chilling effect on attorney 
client relations by creating a conflict of interest between 
attorneys’ duty to provide zealous advocacy to their clients and 
the instinct of self-preservation that those attorneys might face 
when exposed to potential FDCPA liability.123 Furthermore, the 
dissent noted that the FDCPA was not intended to provide 
debtors with highly technical legal claims against debt 
collectors. To the contrary, all of the provisions of the FDCPA 
were originally intended by Congress to sanction debt collectors’ 
deliberate and abusive conduct without harming ethical debt 
collectors.124 The dissent believed that by limiting the bona fide 
error defense to mistakes of fact, the statute would depart even 
further from its original balanced intentions.125 
  
 118 Id. at 1631 (quoting Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Lamar, 503 F.3d 504, 
513 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id.  
 122 Id. at 1633-35. 
 123 Id. at 1634. 
 124 Id. at 1632-33. 
 125 See id. 
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Likewise, the dissent also rejected the majority’s 
contention that the bona fide error defense would allow debt 
collectors to escape liability by pleading ignorance of the law.126 
It found that there was no risk of debt collectors using the bona 
fide error defense to improperly excuse violations of the 
statute, because debt collectors were required to show both an 
unintentional error resulting in a violation of the statute and 
the maintenance of procedures reasonably calculated to avoid 
such error.127 Accordingly, the bona fide error defense could not 
be utilized when debt collectors remained reprehensibly 
ignorant of the law, but rather, only where a particular legal 
issue was so unclear, ambiguous, or unsettled in the courts, 
that despite reasonable efforts to comply, the debt collector 
made an error in legal judgment.128  
3. Jerman as a Critical Lens for Statutory Reform  
Ultimately, my purpose for examining Jerman is not to 
argue that the Court was right or wrong in its decision. Rather, 
Jerman poses important questions to those looking to reform the 
FDCPA. Why is the bona fide error defense so heavily relied upon 
by seemingly sophisticated business actors, with access to 
competent legal resources? Is the FDCPA sufficiently targeting 
the forms of abuse it was originally intended to protect against, or 
can it be retooled and refined to better meet its initial goals? 
The majority in Jerman rationalized that Congress’s 
intent for the FDCPA was to create a two-tiered enforcement 
system that would allow the FTC to use its heavy enforcement 
powers against debt collectors who knowingly violated the 
statute, while giving consumers comparatively much less 
power to sue debt collectors for both knowing and technical 
violations.129 This analysis is problematic because it assumes 
  
 126 Id. at 1637-38. 
 127 Id.  
 128 See id.  
 129 Id. at 1612 (majority opinion). In making this argument the Court 
compared the language of 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c), the bona fide error provision, to the 
language of 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A), from which the FTC derives its enforcement 
powers. The Court found that: 
Given the absence of similar language in § 1692k(c), it is a fair inference that 
Congress chose to permit injured consumers to recover actual damages, costs, 
fees, and modest statutory damages for ‘intentional’ conduct, including 
violations resulting from mistaken interpretation of the FDCPA, while 
reserving the more onerous penalties of the FTC Act for debt collectors whose 
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Congress intended that only the FTC would have the power 
necessary to address the debt collection industry’s most 
egregious abuses, while consumers would be relegated to the 
role of makeweight technical compliance agents. Although 
Congress intended for the FTC to have great financial leverage 
over debt collectors, it also intended that consumers’ private 
cause of action would allow them to pursue the same 
fundamental consumer protection goals as those which were to 
be pursued by the FTC.130 It wanted consumers to act as private 
attorneys general in safeguarding their own rights—not for 
consumers to generate litigation based on cognizable technical 
claims that caused them no actual harm.131  
Likewise, in enacting the FDCPA, Congress believed 
that the majority of debt collectors ran ethical operations that 
would not be affected by the regulations.132 It designed the 
statute to combat abuses by the most fowl-mouthed, 
threatening, and deceptive in the industry, who it believed 
caused a disproportionate amount of harm to consumers.133 The 
problem is that the statute has become a two-tiered system, 
regardless of Congress’s original intentions. The FTC can bring 
only a handful of enforcement actions each year, which allows 
many smaller debt collectors, who are sometimes the most 
abusive in the industry, to proceed undeterred by the FTC’s 
enforcement efforts.134 Comparatively, consumers are left with 
only minor protections against substantive abuse and those 
who are knowledgeable and lucky enough to secure the services 
of a consumer rights attorney do not have the collective 
enforcement power necessary to destroy the profit motives 
underlying the abuse. Finally, ethical debt collectors still face 
significant technical liability under the FDCPA, which places 
them categorically and unfairly in the same punitive 
denomination as the industry’s most prolific abusers. 
  
intentional actions also reflected ‘knowledge fairly implied on the basis of 
objective circumstances’ that the conduct was prohibited. 
Id. 
 130  FTC, THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, supra note 15, at 66-67. 
 131 Id.; see also Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., 516 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 
2008) (finding that “the FDCPA enlists the efforts of sophisticated consumers . . . as 
‘private attorneys general’ to aid their less sophisticated counterparts, who are unlikely 
themselves to bring suit under the Act, but who are assumed by the Act to benefit from 
the deterrent effect of civil actions brought by others”). 
 132 S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696 
(stating that “unscrupulous debt collectors comprise only a small segment of the industry”). 
 133 Id. 
 134 See supra Part I.B. 
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Now that the Jerman Court has held the bona fide error 
defense does not apply to mistakes of law, ethical debt 
collectors have one fewer method to combat litigation based on 
technical violations of the FDCPA as they are forced to 
navigate provisions of the statute that are vague, outdated, and 
unsettled in the courts. The recent uptick in privatized 
consumer protection lawsuits could have positive reformatory 
effects on the debt collection industry by providing a serious 
financial disincentive for debt collectors to engage in abusive 
practices. But Jerman shows us that this potential benefit can 
only be maximized if the statute more deliberately targets 
egregious abuses while allowing the most compliant debt 
collectors in the industry to gain market share by avoiding 
technical FDCPA litigation altogether.  
III. DEBT COLLECTION AND DEBT COLLECTION LAWSUITS IN 
THE WAKE OF THE RECESSION 
This section examines the short- and long-term causes 
of increased consumer credit default and increased debt 
collection efforts, and as a result, increased debt collection 
abuses. It shows that while the debt collection industry has 
undergone significant modernization and organization since the 
FDCPA was enacted, the most egregious patterns of abuse have 
persisted. This section also examines why FDCPA attorneys 
have no practical incentive to litigate substantive abuses over 
technical violations, and it posits several reasons why attorneys 
may actually favor litigating technical violations.  
A. Shotgun Wedding: How a Weak Economy Forces 
Consumers and Debt Collectors into Troubled 
Relationships 
To understand why now is an important moment in 
history to revise the FDCPA, we must briefly examine the 
importance of the act as a consumer protection mechanism in 
today’s credit-driven, yet economically fragile, society. The financial 
crisis of 2008 sent shockwaves through world economies to an 
extent that had not been experienced since the Great Depression.135 
As a result, the credit market is still currently plagued by lingering 
  
 135 Jon Hilsenrath, Serena Ng & Damian Paletta, Worst Crisis Since 30s, with No 
End Yet in Sight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12216943 
1617549947.html. 
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hallmarks of the recession: high unemployment rates,136 low 
wages,137 and depressed property values.138 Due to these economic 
stresses, consumers are more likely to default on their loan 
obligations than ever before,139 sending their credit accounts into 
collection with greater frequency.140  
Lenders have reshaped the debt collection market as 
well. During the financial crisis, lenders realized that the 
credit extended on their balance sheets prior to the recession 
was overvalued; consequently, many banks took measures to 
reduce their outstanding liabilities.141 Financial institutions 
became increasingly willing to charge off delinquent accounts 
and sell debts to third-party debt collectors at a steep discount, 
causing debt collection efforts to increase as the market became 
more lucrative.142 The debt collection industry grew as a result 
of the increasing demand for its services, and became more 
aggressive as collectors found it was increasingly difficult to 
secure payments from consumers who were flat broke.143  
But short-term economic turmoil is not the only cause of 
consumer distress. There has also been a degenerative 
transformation in the economic health of the average American 
  
 136 See Sewell Chan, Before Business Leaders, Bernanke Discusses 
Unemployment’s Toll on Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, at B3, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/01/business/economy/01fed.html. 
 137 See Michael Luo, New Job Means Lower Wages for Many, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 1, 2010), at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/01/us/01jobs.html 
(discussing how many workers are forced to take lower paying jobs in the recession). 
 138 Global House Prices: Bottom Fishing, ECONOMIST, June 6, 2009, at 40. 
 139 The default rate on consumer credit cards reached an all time high of 
thirteen percent in the spring of 2010. A Special Report on Debt: The Morning After, 
ECONOMIST, June 26, 2010, at 70. 
 140 Connie Prater, Consumer Credit Woes Mean Boom in Debt Collection, 
CREDITCARDS.COM, http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/fair-debt-collection-
5125.php (last visited Feb. 19, 2011). 
 141 See Kathy Chu & Sandra Block, As Lenders Clamp Down, Credit Scores 
Take a Hit, USA TODAY, Sept. 23, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/credit/ 
2009-09-21-lenders-scores-credits_N.htm; see also Amy Barrett, Snipping Credit Lines 
for Small Businesses, BS. WK., May 7, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/ 
content/may2009/sb2009056_719759.htm. Interestingly, some banks became more 
likely to settle accounts directly with customers for less than full value upon early 
signs of financial distress. David Streitfeld, Credit Bailout: Issuers Slashing Card 
Balances, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2009, at A1. 
 142 Prices for debt portfolios declined significantly during the financial crisis of 
2008. Ask the Experts: What’s Happened to the Secondary Market for Debt Portfolios?, 
INSIDEARM (July 31, 2008, 9:31 AM), https://www.insidearm.com/daily/debt-buying-
topics/debt-buying/ask-the-experts-whats-happened-to-the-secondary-market-for-debt-
portfolios; see also Prater, supra note 140. 
 143 See supra notes 2-8; see also Blake Jones, More Consumers Face Aggressive 
Debt Collection Tactics, POSTSTAR (Feb. 5, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://poststar.com/news/ 
local/article_b546dc02-3194-11e0-9637-001cc4c002e0.html. 
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family over the past forty years—a trend identified and 
characterized by Elizabeth Warren, even before the Great 
Recession of 2008, as the “coming collapse of the middle 
class.”144 Consumers save less money than they did decades ago 
and increasingly rely upon credit to meet their basic needs.145 
The result is that consumer credit—even absent the 
recession—has slowly but surely become an integral lifeline for 
the average American family146 in the event of sickness, 
unemployment, or other financial setbacks.147  
Consequently, these short- and long-term economic 
pressures have placed Americans at increased risk for credit 
default and loan collections. For many, this means that 
interaction with debt collectors—including verbal and 
psychological abuse—is simply becoming an unavoidable 
reality. And if the recent uptick in FDCPA lawsuit filings is 
any indication,148 the FDCPA is not adequately preventing debt 
collection abuse at a time when the economy is driving increased 
debt collection activity. This trend alone warrants serious 
consideration for better statutory regulation and reform.  
  
 144 Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Univ., Lecture at 
the University of California, Berkley: The Coming Collapse of the Middle Class: Higher 
Risks, Lower Rewards, and a Shrinking Safety Net (Mar. 8, 2007), available at 
http://grad.berkeley.edu/lectures/event.php?id=104&lecturer=102; see generally Elizabeth 
Warren, The Over-Consumption Myth and Other Tales of Law, Economics, and Morality, 
82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1485 (2004) [hereinafter Warren, Over-Consumption Myth]; see also 
Roger L. Torneden, The 80th Anniversary of the Great Crash of 1929: Law, Markets and 
the Role of the State: Will Devaluation of the Dollar Pull the U.S. Out of Depression Once 
Again?, 15 NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 67, 74-75 (2009) (discussing Professor Elizabeth 
Warren’s analysis of the growing debt levels of American families). Elizabeth Warren is 
a Professor at Harvard Law School and was appointed by President Obama in 
September of 2010 to head the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 
See infra note 229 and accompanying text. 
 145 Warren, Over-Consumption Myth, supra note 144, at 1490-1502. 
 146 Id. 
 147 This long-term macrocosmic financial crisis, according to Elizabeth 
Warren, has driven American households with two wage earners to use unsecured 
consumer credit as a means to artificially finance a basic lifestyle—adequate 
healthcare, higher education, and property ownership—which past generations 
comfortably achieved as single-earner households. See sources cited supra note 144. 
 148  See sources cited supra note 10. 
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B. Modern Debt Collection Abuses: New Dogs Learn Old 
Tricks 
The debt collection industry has grown significantly 
since FDCPA was enacted in 1977.149 Along with significant 
growth, the industry has refined, expanded, and modernized its 
business methods in order to maximize efficiency and increase 
profits.150 The debt collection industry formed association trade 
groups that provide a forum for debt collectors to discuss ideas, 
share resources, and present issues relevant to the industry.151 
These groups also seek to integrate debt collection products 
into the industry that will lead to greater standardization and 
profitability,152 as well as promulgate ethical cannons for its 
members that in part urge debt collectors to behave morally 
and to respect consumers’ rights.153 
Given this continued trend towards modernization, 
large-scale organization, and ethical standardization, perhaps 
the most surprising aspect of the modern debt collection 
industry is that many of the abuses about which consumers 
currently complain are the very same abuses that the FDCPA 
was originally enacted to eradicate, including: harassing 
debtors with profanity-laced telephone calls; hounding debtors 
at their workplaces; threatening to have debtors arrested; and 
  
 149 See FTC, THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, supra note 15, at iii-iv; Goldberg, 
supra note 40, at 725-34, 736-39 (discussing the growth of the debt buying industry and 
discussing the industry’s use of outsourced collection calls and demographic profiling tools). 
 150 See sources cited supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 151 See, e.g., DBA INT’L, http://www.dbainternational.org (last visited Feb. 10, 
2011) (“DBA International is a source of experienced, knowledgeable and ethical debt 
buyers and other industry participants that provides educational and networking 
opportunities through an annual conference.”). 
 152 See, e.g., DBA International Mission Statement, DBA INT’L, http://www. 
dbainternational.org/what_is_dba/mission.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2011) (“By 
providing products, services and education to its members, DBA International 
enhances the economic performance and liquidity of the international financial services 
industry and fosters the ability of consumers to participate in the marketplace for 
goods and services.”). 
 153 See, e.g., DBA International Ethics Rules and Ethical Considerations for 
DBA Members, DBA INT’L, http://www.dbainternational.org/what_is_dba/code_of_ 
ethics.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2011) [hereinafter DBA Ethics Code]. 
A Member’s staff should be dignified and refrain from all illegal and morally 
reprehensible conduct. Because of the industry’s perception to the public and 
the impact on the consumers it comes into contact with, even minor violations 
of law by a Member may tend to lessen public confidence in the profession. 
Obedience to law exemplifies respect for law. To Members especially, respect for 
the law should be more than a platitude. 
Id. 
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threatening debtors with physical violence.154 These forms of 
abuse are particularly egregious because they distort the power 
relationship between creditor and debtor—using deception to 
create the impression that the debt collector holds legal or moral 
authority over the debtor—triggering emotions of guilt, shame, 
fear, hopelessness, and eventually capitulation.155 The resulting 
implication of these continued abuses is that while the debt 
collection industry as a whole purports to have made great 
strides towards creating a framework that respects consumers’ 
rights, the temptation to engage in abusive practices remains 
despite the well-established prohibitions set forth by the 
FDCPA, and despite the industry’s own efforts to disassociate 
itself from such practices by promulgating guidelines that label 
them as unethical.156  
So why do some debt collectors still resort to the same 
abusive practices that have earned the industry a sour 
reputation among the regulators and the general public? The 
answer is simple—profit. The primary goal of most serious 
forms of debt collection abuse is to increase the likelihood that 
the debtor will pay by pressuring or deceiving the debtor to 
redistribute his or her limited resources towards making debt 
payments.157 Where a debtor must ration limited funds between 
basic needs and an array of snowballing debt maintenance 
obligations, the debtor should rationally meet his or her basic 
needs before making debt payments. Debt collectors can create 
the impetus needed to deceive debtors into reprioritizing their 
limited resources by using abuse to override their rational 
instincts of self-preservation.158  
Although the goal is the same, the tactics vary. Some 
debt collectors misrepresent the power they have over debtors, 
  
 154 See sources cited supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
 155 The psychological pressure that consumers experience as a result of debt 
collection abuse is analogous to the pressure that others have argued causes 
homeowners to make payments on mortgages that are underwater. See Brent T. White, 
Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social Management of the 
Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 986-1006 (2010) (discussing how the 
government and the financial industry seek to foment a societal sense of moral 
obligation that homeowners should avoid foreclosure at all costs). Abusive debt 
collectors sometimes resort to highly elaborate means just to create this power 
distortion. See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 156 See DBA Ethics Code, supra note 153.  
 157 See White, supra note 155, at 986-1006 and accompanying text; see Neil, 
supra note 7.  
 158 See White, supra note 155, at 986-1006 and accompanying text; Neil, supra 
note 7. 
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threatening them with fictitious lawsuits or jail.159 Other debt 
collectors harass or threaten to harass a debtor’s employer to 
place pressure on the debtor by endangering the one financial 
lifeline that the debtor has left—a job.160 Still, other debt 
collectors repetitively harass debtors on the phone to coerce 
payment by triggering feelings of guilt, shame, and failure in the 
debtor—appealing to the debtor’s traditional notions of moral 
responsibility.161 At a time when most debtors are already at 
their lowest, these unrelenting tactics are inexcusable and 
predatory; however, little stands to change in a market where 
abuse is more profitable than compliance with the law.  
C. Any Claim Will Do: The Rise of Technical FDCPA 
Lawsuits 
While clearly there is a rising trend in abusive debt 
collection practices, not all litigated FDCPA violations cause 
plaintiffs actual harm.162 There are several reasons why 
consumer rights attorneys bring lawsuits predicated on debt 
collectors’ technical violations of the FDCPA. First, cases that 
involve serious FDCPA violations are often readily identifiable 
to only one plaintiff at a time. In other words, substantive 
abuses more often need to be litigated on an individual basis 
whereas technical violations often present facts that are readily 
certifiable as a class action. For example, a mass-mailed letter 
that violates the FDCPA easily establishes many of the basic 
requirements for a class action: that “(1) the class is so 
numerous that the joinder of all the members is impractical; (2) 
there are questions of law and fact common to the class; and (3) 
the claims or defenses of the representative party are typical of 
the claims or defenses of the class.”163 This translates into 
greater statutory damages and higher fees for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys than does a single-party lawsuit.164 
A second reason that attorneys pursue technical 
violations is because they know that the trajectory for the 
overwhelming majority of cases is settlement, regardless of 
whether their clients’ claims would be successful if fully 
  
 159 See sources cited supra notes 4, 7. 
 160 See sources cited supra note 3. 
 161 See White, supra note 155, at 986-1006.  
 162 See supra Part II.B. 
 163 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 
 164 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2006). 
1580 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol.76:4 
litigated on the merits.165 Because the maximum amount of 
statutory damages available to FDCPA litigants is capped at 
$1000, the settlement amounts sought are small enough that 
debt collectors view settlement as economically advantageous—
even where they may possess a meritorious defense.166 The 
result is that lawyers can pursue technical violations knowing 
that the cost of defending the violation provides enough 
leverage for settlement—long-term litigation strategy is rarely 
needed.167 A tenuous yet cognizable claim premised on a 
statutory technicality, therefore, may be worth just as much as 
a claim alleging far more substantive abuse. 
Further, many lawyers who pursue technical violations 
might just be honoring their responsibility to provide their 
clients with zealous advocacy.168 Lawyers who are retained by 
debtors to represent them in their dealings with debt collectors 
can use technical violations of the FDCPA as a sword rather 
than a shield, filing suit on identifiable technical deficiencies in 
an effort to gain leverage in the settlement of the underlying 
debt.169 Since technical claims are permissible under the 
current framework of the FDCPA, a lawyer can legitimately 
argue that it would be unethical not to file a cognizable lawsuit 
on behalf of a client. While no one can fault an attorney for 
placing his or her client in the best possible position to obtain a 
favorable outcome, the FDCPA was originally intended as a 
means of protecting consumers against substantive abuse and 
was never intended as a weapon to quell the repayment 
pursuits of valid debt holders.170  
  
 165 See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L.P.A., 130 S. Ct. 
1605, 1628-31 (2010) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the motivation for attorneys 
to file technical lawsuits in anticipation of pretrial settlement). 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT: pmbl. (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously 
asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a 
lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of 
honest dealings with others.”). 
 169 See Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions L.L.C., 499 F.3d 926, 941 (9th Cir. 2007) 
The Act was meant to shield debtors from abusive collection practices, but it 
was never intended to shift the balance of power between debtors and creditors 
such that a debt collector cannot work with a debtor’s attorney to settle claims 
without exposing itself to liability out of proportion to the debt allegedly owed. 
Nor was it intended as a sword to be brandished by debtors who have retained 
counsel-the very debtors least in need of the Act’s protections. 
Id. 
 170 See id.; S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1695, 1696 (stating that it is the FDCPA’s purpose “to protect consumers from a host of 
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There is also an emerging sense in the debt collection 
industry that the predators have become the prey. Debt 
collectors who have faced litigation often complain that the 
FDCPA is a loophole for deadbeats to hinder valid collection 
efforts by bringing costly, frivolous litigation.171 In fact, to 
capitalize on the fear of FDCPA litigation in the debt collection 
industry, some companies market FDCPA tracking services 
that are designed to provide debt collectors with an updated 
list of debtors who have filed FDCPA lawsuits so that the debt 
collectors can clean their files in order to avoid potential 
litigation.172 The implication is that FDCPA plaintiffs are 
repeat litigants and that it is cheaper for debt collectors to 
avoid pursuing litigious debtors altogether rather than face the 
possibility of defending expensive FDCPA lawsuits in court. 
Consequently, consumer rights attorneys can potentially free 
their clients from debt collectors’ efforts just by landing them on 
the industry’s blacklist by filing an FDCPA lawsuit. This provides 
a strong practical incentive for both consumers and their 
attorneys to sue for any FDCPA violation—the egregiousness of 
the debt collector’s offense is simply not a relevant factor. 
IV. SYMPATHY FOR THE DEVIL: THE DIFFICULTY OF 
COMPLYING WITH THE AMBIGUOUS PROVISIONS OF THE 
FDCPA 
Although it is highly unlikely that there will ever be a 
public outcry for statutory reforms that benefit debt collectors, 
the structure and ambiguity of the FDCPA has made it 
relatively easy for inventive lawyers to form highly technical, 
cognizable claims against debt collectors, even where their 
clients suffer no actual harm.173 The result, in some cases, has 
been to make it impossible for creditors to achieve compliance 
with FDCPA, leaving them open to potential litigation based 
  
unfair, harassing, and deceptive debt collection practices without imposing unnecessary 
restrictions on ethical debt collectors”). 
 171 See Gordon, supra note 10. 
 172 See, e.g., FDCPA CASE LISTING SERVICE LLC, http://www.fdcpacases.org/ 
page/page/4544578.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2011); About Us, WEBRECON, https:// 
www.webrecon.com/b/about (last visited Feb. 10, 2011). 
 173 See Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 133, 138 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 516 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(“Ironically, it appears that it is often the extremely sophisticated consumer who takes 
advantage of the civil liability scheme defined by this statute, not the individual who 
has been threatened or misled. The cottage industry that has emerged does not bring 
suits to remedy the ‘widespread and serious national problem’ of abuse that the Senate 
observed in adopting the legislation . . . .”). 
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upon courts’ varying and unsettled interpretations of the 
statute’s most ill-crafted and outdated provisions. This section 
will not provide a comprehensive analysis of all the FDCPA’s 
compliance pitfalls—many of which have been discussed 
elsewhere—but it does discuss a few to help frame reform 
proposals that will reduce debt collectors’ technical compliance 
problems and thereby redirect the FDCPA’s focus towards 
combating more harmful consumer abuses.  
A. Catch-22: The FDCPA’s Validation Notification 
Requirement  
The validation notification requirement of the FDCPA is 
one of its most frequently litigated provisions.174 Legal 
commentators have noted that the ambiguities in this provision 
of the statute have generated litigation predicated on a number 
of technical compliance pitfalls involving, among other things, 
disputes over the size, font, location, form, and language of 
debt collectors’ § 1692g notices.175 Despite calls for reform, 
however, the traditional compliance problems generated by the 
FDCPA’s validation notification provision persist. For example, 
in Jerman the district court—prior to granting defendant’s 
summary judgment motion on the bona fide error defense—
found that the defendants violated § 1692g because their 
validation notice limited plaintiff’s rights by stating that if she 
wanted to dispute her debt, she was required to dispute it in 
writing.176 Now that the Supreme Court has reversed the 
summary judgment ruling on appeal, the district court’s 
original determination stands.177 
But the courts do not consistently apply § 1692g. For 
example, in Nero v. Law Office of Sam Streeter, P.L.L.C., 
plaintiff sued a debt collector on the theory that the debt 
collector violated § 1692g because it “failed to inform her that 
  
 174 Christian Stueben, Note, Judge or Jury? Determining Deception or 
Misrepresentation Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3107, 3116 (2010) (stating that 15 U.S.C. § 1692g is one of the most frequently litigated 
provisions of the FDCPA). 
 175 See, e.g., Derek S. Burrell, The Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: 
An Overview Rx for Debt Collector Myopia, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 25-29 (1996); Elwin 
Griffith, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act—Reconciling the Interests of Consumers 
and Debt Collectors, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 29-51 (1999). 
 176 Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L.P.A., 538 F.3d 469, 
471 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 177 Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L.P.A., 130 S. Ct. 
1605 (2010); Jerman, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 724-25. 
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she must request verification of the debt in writing.”178 Plaintiff 
argued that defendant was required to advise her that she 
must contest the debt in writing and that debt collector had 
impermissibly implied that if she contested the debt orally it 
would trigger her statutory right to debt validation.179 
Accordingly, the plaintiff argued that the notice was 
misleading because the debt collector was under no legal 
obligation to honor an oral validation request.180 The court 
agreed with the plaintiff and granted his summary judgment 
motion, assessing a judgment against defendant, in favor of 
plaintiff, for statutory damages, costs, and attorney fees.181 
While the district courts in Jerman and Nero reached opposite 
conclusions regarding a debt collector’s duty under § 1692g, 
they both recognized that the plaintiff need not show any actual 
harm to prevail.182 This conflict illustrates that § 1692g of the 
FDCPA has become a catch-22—a debt collector must walk an 
unnecessarily fine line to avoid liability, and ultimately its guilt is 
less a product of its actual conduct than an arbitrary determination 
dependent upon the jurisdiction in which the claim is filed.  
Yet despite the existing compliance problems, the FTC 
has recommended that Congress amend § 1692g to require 
additional disclosures.183 While this proposal seeks the 
commendable goal of implementing enhanced consumer 
  
 178 Nero v. Law Office of Sam Streeter, P.L.L.C., 655 F. Supp. 2d 200, 204 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009). In Nero, the debt collector gave plaintiff a notice that stated: 
Unless you, the consumer, notify this office within thirty days after receipt of 
this notice that you dispute the validity of the debt or any portion thereof, the 
debt will be assumed to be valid by this office. If you, the consumer, notify us 
within the thirty (30) days after receipt of this notice, that the debt or any 
portion thereof is disputed, this office will obtain verification of the debt or a 
copy of a judgment against you and a copy of such verification or judgment will 
be mailed to you by this office. Upon your written request within thirty days 
after receipt of this notice this office will provide you with the name and 
address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor . . . . 
Id. at 203. 
 179 Id. at 206. 
 180 Id.  
 181 Id. at 212. 
 182 See Jerman, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (finding that the court must apply an 
objective standard from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer); see Nero, 
655 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (“In the Second Circuit, the question of whether a 
communication complies with the FDCPA is determined from the perspective of the 
‘least sophisticated consumer.’” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 183 See FTC, THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, supra note 15, at 29-30. 
Specifically, it was suggested in this workshop that debtors should be notified that by 
invoking their right for debt verification, they effectively halt all further collection 
proceedings until verification can be made. Id. 
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protections, it would currently be irresponsible to simply 
append additional requirements onto the FDCPA’s validation 
notice provision. Without regulatory clarification of § 1692g, 
these additional requirements are likely to lead to more 
technical litigation and further divert the statute from its 
original purpose of protecting against substantive debt 
collection abuses without inhibiting ethical debt collectors.184 
The disclosure provisions of the FDCPA do not need additional 
embellishments—they need total regulatory overhaul.  
B. Can You Hear Me Now? Communication Is a Problem  
Since the adaptation of the FDCPA in 1977, debt 
collectors have often employed emerging technology to assist in 
contacting consumers regarding their outstanding debts.185 
However, Congress did not anticipate society’s future reliance 
on cell phones, e-mails, fax machines, and voice messaging 
machines.186 Although the FTC has recognized the need to 
revise the FDCPA to provide regulations for debt collectors who 
seek to implement modern communication technology, it does 
not have rulemaking authority necessary to issue binding 
regulations; therefore, it has largely lacked the ability to issue 
definitive guidance.187 The result has been to expose debt collectors 
to liability, not because they seek to willfully violate the statute to 
gain a competitive advantage, but because the statute’s provisions 
are simply too outdated to address the unique problems that arise 
when debt collectors use modern technology.188  
  
 184 See supra Part I.A. 
 185 FTC, THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, supra note 15, at 14-20. 
 186 Id. at 47-50; GAO, EVOLVING DEBT COLLECTION MARKETPLACE, supra note 
61, at 47-49.  
 187 For example, the FTC’s current stance on whether the FDCPA allows debt 
collectors to use e-mail to communicate with debtors essentially tells debt collectors 
that it is not illegal per se, but to use it at their own risk: 
In the absence of data demonstrating that there is a higher risk of revealing to 
third parties that a consumer’s debt is in collection, the FTC does not believe 
that the imposition of any special limitations on debt collectors’ use of email 
and instant messages is now justified. Nevertheless, the Commission 
emphasizes that if a debt collector reveals the existence of a debt to a third 
party through any method, including email and instant messaging, the collector 
is and should be liable for violating Section 805(b) of the FDCPA. 
FTC, THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, supra note 15, at 50-51. This analysis of offers 
little guidance to debt collectors other than to say that debt collectors using modern 
technologies may face liability under the FDCPA.  
 188 See id. at 35-36; see also GAO, EVOLVING DEBT COLLECTION MARKETPLACE, 
supra note 61, at 49. 
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For example, the debt collection industry has 
complained to the FTC that answering machine messages pose 
significant problems for collectors.189 Specifically, it is a 
violation of the FDCPA for a debt collector to call a debtor 
without meaningful disclosure of the debt collector’s identity.190 
However, the FDCPA also prohibits the debt collector from 
disclosing debts to any unauthorized third party.191 In a society 
before answering machines and voicemail, compliance with 
both of these provisions may have been straightforward; 
however, today debt collectors must decide, without guidance 
from the FDCPA or the FTC, how to provide meaningful 
identification in its messages while avoiding the possibility 
that they may be overheard by a third party.192  
Edwards v. Niagara Credit Solutions, Inc.193 illustrates 
this dilemma. In Edwards, the debt collector left a message on 
the debtor’s answering machine that stated the following: “This 
is an important message for Edwards Brenda. [sic] Please 
return this message at 1-800-381-0416, between the hours of 8 
a.m. and 9 p.m. eastern standard time. It is important that you 
reach our office.”194 The debt collector left a similar voice 
message approximately a month later.195 The plaintiff sued the 
debt collector alleging that its prerecorded telephone messages 
violated the FDCPA because they failed to identify the caller as 
a debt collector pursuant to § 1692e(11).196 In defense, the debt 
collector argued that it intentionally violated the identification 
requirement so that it would not violate § 1692c(b), which 
prohibits disclosure of the debt to third parties.197 The debt 
collector also asserted the bona fide error defense—claiming 
that its good faith effort to comply with the statute by avoiding 
disclosure to third parties warranted immunity from liability.198  
Not surprisingly, the court was unsympathetic to the 
debt collector’s legal conundrum. The court held that in order 
for the defense to apply, the debt collector had to show the 
  
 189  See FTC, THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, supra note 15, at 47-49. 
 190 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) (2006). 
 191 Id. § 1692c(b). 
 192 See FTC, THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, supra note 15, at 47-50; GAO, 
EVOLVING DEBT COLLECTION MARKETPLACE, supra note 61, at 49. 
 193 584 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 194 Id. at 1351. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 1352. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
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violation “(1) was not intentional; (2) was a bona fide error; and 
(3) occurred despite the maintenance of procedures reasonably 
adapted to avoid any such error.”199 The court easily dismissed 
this defense, holding that the calls could not rightfully be 
claimed as unintentional bona fide errors when the debt 
collector admitted to intentionally violating one provision of the 
statute to protect against violating another.200 
Although the court in Edwards scolded Niagara for 
intentionally violating one provision of the FDCPA in order to 
avoid the possibility of violating another, recent case law 
demonstrates that Niagara’s fears were justified. Other courts 
have held that where debt collectors identify themselves in 
answering machine messages and provide the statutorily 
mandated warnings, the messages nonetheless may violate the 
FDCPA because they may be heard by a third party.201 The 
following message was designed by a debt collector to both 
“meaningfully disclose” the debt collector’s identity and avoid the 
possibility of revealing the debt to an unauthorized third party:202 
This message is for [ ]. If you are not [ ] or their spouse, please delete 
this message. If you are [ ] or their spouse, please continue to listen 
to this message. By continuing to listen to this message, you 
acknowledge that you are the right party. You should not listen to 
this message so that other people can hear it, as it contains personal 
and private information. There will be a three second pause in the 
message to allow you to listen to the message in private. (Pause.) My 
name is John Carter. I am a debt collector with FCSI. This is an 
attempt to collect a debt, and any information will be used for that 
purpose. It is important that you return my call at 1-866-550-8949.
203
 
  
 199 Id. at 1352-53. 
 200 Id. at 1353-54. 
Just as it is not reasonable to destroy a village in order to save it, neither is it 
reasonable to violate an Act in order to comply with it. It was not reasonable for 
Niagara to violate § 1692e(11) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act with 
every message it left in order to avoid the possibility that some of those 
messages might lead to a violation of § 1692c(b). 
Id. 
 201 Koby v. ARS Nat’l Servs., Inc., No. 09cv0780 JAH (JMA), 2010 WL 
1438763, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2010) (finding that “[n]othing in the FDCPA or the 
Constitution entitles or guarantees a debt collector the right to leave a message on a 
debtor’s voice mail”); Leahey v. Franklin Collection Serv., Inc., No. 2:09-cv-00709-AKK, 
2010 WL 5279831, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2010) (denying defendant’s motion to 
dismiss where plaintiff’s friend claimed to have overheard collection message left on 
plaintiff’s answering machine); Berg v. Merchants Ass’n Collection Div., Inc., 586 F. 
Supp. 2d 1336, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2008).  
 202 Leahey, 2010 WL 5279831, at *1. 
 203 Id. 
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The court, in Leahey v. Franklin Collection Service, Inc., 
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss—despite its 
attempted statutory juggling act—because the defendant’s 
phone message was insufficient to overcome plaintiff’s cause of 
action alleging that defendant violated § 1962c(b).204 If nothing 
else, this message clearly demonstrates the legal contortion 
that some debt collectors utilize just to access modern forms of 
communication under the FDCPA. But Leahey also confirms 
that even where a debt collector designs voice messages that are 
painstakingly crafted to comply with all applicable provisions of 
the FDCPA, liability—or at least protracted litigation—may 
simply be unavoidable. Until debt collectors are provided with 
formal guidelines, it seems that the only way for debt collectors 
to maintain unassailable compliance with the FDCPA is to avoid 
leaving answering machine messages altogether.205 
Likewise, the debt collection industry has complained 
that collectors also face similar challenges due to lack of 
guidance when attempting to contact debtors on their cell 
phones.206 More consumers are listing a cell phone as their 
primary contact number.207 The lack of specific cell phone 
regulations creates potential liability for debt collectors similar 
to the liability they face by leaving answering machine 
messages. For example, since cell phones are portable, a debtor 
may claim that he or she was contacted at an inconvenient 
place even though the debt collector would not rightfully have 
any knowledge of the debtor’s location.208 A debtor might be 
traveling and crossing into different time zones causing the 
debt collector to violate the prohibition against calling between 
the hours of 9:00pm and 8:00am, even though the initial call 
may have been made under the assumption that the debtor 
was in his or her home time zone.209 If Edwards and Leahey are 
any indication, it is unlikely that courts would find that such 
messages did not violate the FDCPA just because the debtor’s 
location was impossible to ascertain.  
Debt collectors’ inability to communicate may detrimentally 
affect consumers as well. Notably, some debt collectors have 
forgone all meaningful attempts to communicate with debtors and 
  
 204 Id. at *5. 
 205 See Edwards, 584 F.3d at 1354 (holding that the FDCPA “does not 
guarantee a debt collector the right to leave answering machine messages”). 
 206 GAO, EVOLVING DEBT COLLECTION MARKETPLACE, supra note 61, at 47-49.  
 207 FTC, THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, supra note 15, at 16.  
 208 GAO, EVOLVING DEBT COLLECTION MARKETPLACE, supra note 61, at 48.  
 209 FTC, THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, supra note 15, at 42. 
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have instead opted to file lawsuits against debtors en masse in 
an effort in collect enforceable default judgments.210 While this 
practice is not illegal per se, it has garnered serious concern 
from the FTC, legal commentators, and the media.211 In cases 
where debt collectors are mass-producing hundreds, sometimes 
thousands, of lawsuits against debtors daily, there is serious 
doubt as to whether they are verifying claims with appropriate 
due diligence, or even properly serving debtors upon 
commencement of a legal action.212 Currently, the overwhelming 
majority of debtors do not contest debt collectors’ automated 
enforcement actions, leading to a default judgment rate that by 
some estimates is as high as 95 percent.213 This trend suggests 
that some debt collectors may view litigation as a favorable 
alternative to contacting consumers under the FDCPA’s 
antiquated guidelines. Consequently, the lack of clear 
regulation regarding communication in the debt collection 
process may also hurt consumers.  
V. PROPOSED FDCPA REFORMS 
The FDCPA must be amended with additional 
protections that destroy the profit motives underlying the debt 
collection industry’s most abusive practices. In addition, the 
FDCPA has to allow otherwise ethical debt collectors to flourish 
in the marketplace by eliminating technical compliance 
obstacles and enhancing their ability to profit through controlled 
access to existing and emerging communication technologies. 
This section offers some reforms in furtherance of these goals 
  
 210 Victoria J. Haneman, The Ethical Exploitation of the Unrepresented 
Consumer, 73 MO. L. REV. 707, 717-19 (2008) (discussing how the debt-buying industry 
uses the legal process to enter default judgments against defendants to collect time-
barred debt). Andrew Martin, Automated Debt-Collection Lawsuits Engulf Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 13, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/business/ 
13collection.html; David Segal, Debt Collectors Face a Hazard: Writer’s Cramp, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/business/ 
01debt.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. 
 211 See generally Haneman, supra note 210; Martin, supra note 210; Segal, 
supra note 210; FTC, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 15, at 6-36. 
 212 FTC, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 15, at 6-11; Segal, supra 
note 210 (“[O]ften, essential background information simply is not acquired by debt 
buyers . . . . Without that information it is hard to imagine how any company could 
meet the legal standard of due diligence.”).  
 213 The FTC polled industry panelists at its recent workshop and estimated 
the default judgment rate against debtors to be between sixty and ninety-five percent. 
FTC, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 15, at 7. Other estimates place the 
default rate at between seventy and ninety percent. Haneman, supra note 210, at 722. 
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and examines the recent creation of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau as a timely catalyst for change. 
A. Damages  
The FTC is an effective organization, but it has limited 
resources and must balance its caseload with other goals. At its 
core, the FDCPA is a self-enforcement statute, empowering 
consumers to act as private attorneys general by bringing 
individual enforcement actions against abusive debt 
collectors.214 However, the statute’s monetary penalties for 
private parties are severely limited and, in practice, the FTC 
has much broader financial leverage over abusive debt 
collectors.215 Accordingly, the private action damages provisions 
of the FDCPA should be more closely modeled after the FTC’s 
enforcement powers rather than functioning like the “modest” 
powers conceptualized by the majority in Jerman.216 
Specifically, the statute should be modified to allow 
punitive damages for egregious debt collection abuses. Punitive 
damages are already provided for in the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act.217 Punitive damages would attract more qualified attorneys 
to pursue the worst debt collection abuses and make lawsuits 
involving technical violations less attractive comparatively. 
Overall, a punitive damages provision would have many 
positive reformatory effects on the FDCPA, including: acting as 
a deterrent to consumer abuse; providing an incentive for 
talented attorneys to compete for and litigate the most 
egregious abuses of the FDCPA; and giving judges and juries 
more discretion to enforce the FDCPA by punishing the worst 
offenders in proportion to the egregiousness of the offense. 
Perhaps most importantly, increased sanctions for the most 
egregious violations of the FDCPA would reduce the profit 
motives underlying the industry’s worst practices. It would also 
  
 214 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2006); see Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 
F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that “the FDCPA enlists the efforts of sophisticated 
consumers . . . as ‘private attorneys general’ to aid their less sophisticated counterparts, 
who are unlikely themselves to bring suit under the Act, but who are assumed by the Act 
to benefit from the deterrent effect of civil actions brought by others”). 
 215 See supra Part I.B. 
 216 Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich L.P.A., 130 S. Ct. 
1605, 1612-13 (2010). 
 217 Fair Credit Reporting Act § 616a(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2) (2006); Jessica 
L. Hannah & Kevan P. McLaughlin, Comment, “On Certiorari to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals”: The Supreme Court’s Review of Ninth Circuit Cases During the 
October 2006 Term, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 409, 445 (2008). 
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negate the competitive advantage that some debt collector’s 
derive from these tactics and cause them to rethink their business 
methods or face the possibility of being litigated out of existence.  
Finally, as the FTC and others have noted, the statutory 
damage provision of the FDCPA has never been indexed for 
inflation.218 The statutory maximum of $1000 affords little relief 
to consumers compared to when the statute was first enacted. In 
2009, the FDCPA’s maximum statutory award of $1000 was 
worth only approximately $267 in 1977 dollars.219 The FDCPA’s 
damages provision must be adjusted to compensate for this 
inflation. By allowing inflation to steadily erode the damages 
provision of the FDCPA, the legislature is complicit in providing 
less and less protection to consumers, year after year.  
B. Integrating Technology into the Debt Collection Industry 
The numerous challenges created by existing and 
emerging technologies have already become readily apparent to 
regulators.220 Technology such as e-mail, text messaging, and 
social networking has the potential to fundamentally transform 
and to increase the efficiency of the debt collection industry.221 
Many debt collectors realize that the only way to reach some 
consumers in the future may be through modern 
communication technologies.222 Balanced FDCPA reform must 
provide debt collectors with a way to raise profits through the 
ethical use of emerging technology, while nonetheless 
encouraging the industry to altogether abandon the 
psychologically coercive and deceptive tactics that have given it 
a bad reputation. Accordingly, regulators should be willing to 
facilitate the debt collection industry’s access to advanced 
  
 218 FTC, THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, supra note 15, at B67; Ronald J. Mann 
& Katherine Porter, Saving Up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289, 335 (2010). 
 219 This calculation was derived using an inflation calculator, which is 
available at http://www.westegg.com/inflation (last visited on Feb. 7, 2011). 
 220 See generally FTC, THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, supra note 15.  
 221 William P. Hoffman, Comment, Recapturing the Congressional Intent Behind 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 549, 566-68 (2010) 
(discussing the potential for the debt collection industry to use e-mail and text messaging to 
increase efficiency). These technologies are already being utilized by some debt collectors. 
See Alice Townsend, Collectors Are Tracking Down Debtors Through Social Media, TIME 
(Jan. 14, 2011), http://techland.time.com/2011/01/14/collectors-are-tracking-down-debtors-
through-social-media; Lisa Rogak, Debt Collection Goes Virtual, CREDITCARDS.COM (Oct. 16, 
2008), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/virtual-debt-collection-agents-1273.php. 
For a discussion of debt collectors in the U.K. using text messaging, see also Louise Bolotin, 
Now It’s Debt Collection—By Text, THE OBSERVER, June 3, 2007, at 16, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2007/jun/03/creditanddebt.observercashsection. 
 222 See FTC, THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, supra note 15, at 35. 
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communication technologies and make it a partner in 
regulation rather than an adversary.  
The rapid proliferation of communication technologies is 
such, however, that onetime amendments or statutory reforms to 
the FDCPA will not be enough to ensure that it adequately 
regulates and guides the industry. As the debt collection industry 
integrates new communication technologies, it is possible, if not 
likely, that unethical debt collectors will simply gain additional 
resources to abuse consumers. Regulators must ensure that 
emerging technology does not give debt collectors new and 
innovative ways to abuse consumers, or give them the 
opportunity to outsource abuse to a clandestine network of foreign 
cyber bullies who fall beyond the jurisdiction of our courts.223 It is 
essential that this regulatory framework be dynamically crafted 
to deal with new forms of abuse as they emerge, rather than rely 
on a static system that restricts regulators to the role of observer 
and post-violation enforcer.224 Luckily, the newly formed 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau may provide the impetus 
necessary to enact meaningful change.  
C. The Birth of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
On July 21, 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.225 As part of this 
massive reform effort, Title X of the act, also known individually 
as the “Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010,” created the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).226 The new 
bureau is intended to consolidate and unify the powers of 
various federal agencies that had been tasked with different 
  
 223 See Goldberg, supra note 40, at 732-36 (discussing the regulatory 
difficulties created by the outsourcing of debt collection calls). 
 224 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(d) (2006). Despite this author’s reluctance to open the door 
for debt collectors to use new forms of communication without strict regulation, there is 
notably an implicit safeguard against threats and harassment. When debt collectors and 
consumers eventually interact online and through other emerging mediums, abuses will 
be far more likely to leave an incriminating digital paper trail, which will give debtors 
greater evidentiary ammunition of abuse and which may deter debt collectors from 
incurring the risk of litigation associated with harassing and threatening conduct. 
 225 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The stated purpose of the Act was “[to] promote the 
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in 
the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending 
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices . . . .” Id. at 1376. 
 226 See id. at 1955. Although the agency is named the “Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection” in the Act, the agency has designated itself publicly as the “Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau” (CFPB). See Learn About the Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). 
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consumer protection functions.227 Part of its stated statutory 
objective is to “exercise its authorities under Federal consumer 
financial law for the purposes of ensuring that, with respect to 
consumer financial products and services . . . consumers are 
protected from unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices 
and from discrimination,” and to ensure that “outdated, 
unnecessary, or unduly burdensome regulations are regularly 
identified and addressed in order to reduce unwarranted 
regulatory burdens.”228 At first glance, these stated objectives 
align perfectly with the FDCPA’s need for reform. 
The agency, however, has already suggested that its 
primary focus will be to regulate the lending industry by 
simplifying credit card and loan agreements so that consumers 
have the requisite knowledge required to avoid oppressive debt 
loads and interest rates.229 While focusing on reducing the 
complexity of these agreements is an important and sizeable 
primary task, the CFPB should not limit its role to regulating 
  
 227 See Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 § 1061, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5581 
(West 2011). An informational video on the CFPB’s website also explains the lack of 
regulatory accountability is due to the fractured nature of consumer protection functions 
entrusted to several different agencies. See Learn About the Bureau, supra note 226. 
 228 12 U.S.C.A. § 5511(b)(2)-(3) (West 2011). 
 229 In September 2010, President Obama appointed Professor Elizabeth 
Warren to head the creation of the CFPB. Kenneth R. Bazinet, Obama Taps Elizabeth 
Warren to Launch Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 18, 
2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2010/09/18/2010-09-18_new_sheriff_on_street_ 
obama_taps_adviser_to_crack_down_on_financial_high_jinks.html. Professor Warren 
was chosen for the position partially for her reputation as a fierce public advocate and 
her role overseeing the Troubled Asset Relief Program’s Congressional Oversight 
Panel. However, more importantly, she was also chosen for the position because the 
concept for the CFPB was an idea that grew largely out of her decades of academic 
work studying the causes of consumer debt and bankruptcy. It is perhaps, therefore, a 
reasonable expectation that the focus of the CFPB will be modeled after the regulatory 
framework she previously conceptualized, which focused largely on reducing 
complexity in the credit markets to provide consumers with clearer financial choices 
prior to taking out loans. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making 
Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, [98-100] (2008). Indeed, early indications suggest 
that the agency will adapt this goal as its central principle:  
The central mission of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is to 
make markets for consumer financial products and services work for 
Americans—whether they are applying for a mortgage, choosing among credit 
cards, or using any number of other consumer financial products . . . . Above all, 
this means ensuring that consumers get the information they need to make the 
financial decisions they believe are best for themselves and their families—that 
prices are clear up front, that risks are visible, and that nothing is buried in 
fine print. In a market that works, consumers should be able to make direct 
comparisons among products and no provider should be able to build, or feel 
pressure to build, a business model around unfair, deceptive, or abusive 
practices.  
Learn About the Bureau, supra note 226. 
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the actions of large financial institutions at the lending stage of 
the debt cycle. The CFPB has much broader statutory 
authority to effect wide-scale changes in the consumer financial 
market—this includes the express authority to both regulate 
and enforce provisions of the FDCPA.230 One of the stated goals 
that Congress anticipated for the CFPB even prior to its 
creation was to “enforce federal laws related to consumer 
financial protection by establishing rules and issuing orders 
and guidance.”231 Accordingly, when the CFPB was created it 
was endowed with the broad rulemaking authority necessary to 
implement enforceable regulations for all the consumer laws 
covered by its provisions, including the FDCPA.232 
Technically then, the CFPB has the power necessary to 
reshape the debt collection industry by making compliance 
with the FDCPA easier and making substantive abuse more 
costly and difficult.233 The biggest hurdle to reform, however, 
might be convincing the CFPB to focus some of its resources on 
debt collection abuses—which occur at the end of the debt 
cycle—when the impetus for the agency’s creation was large-
scale subprime loan origination.234 Considering that the CFPB’s 
primary goal is to implement reforms that combat the 
proliferation of complex consumer financial products—a 
regulatory focus that targets the beginning stages of the debt 
cycle rather than the end stages—and given that the CFPB is 
still in its infancy as an agency, it is too early to determine 
whether it will choose to actively regulate the debt collection 
industry or whether it will delegate this task primarily to the 
FTC and focus on its other priorities. Assuming that the CFPB 
does designate some of its resources and attention to the task 
of actively regulating the FDCPA, however, the following 
  
 230 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 5481(12)(H), (14), 5512(a), 5564(a) (West 2011). 
 231 S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 215 (2010). 
 232 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 5481(12)(H), (14), 5512(a), 5564(a). Rulemaking authority is 
also, notably, an important power that the FTC currently lacks. 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(d) (2006). 
 233 There is a very narrow exception to the CFPB’s rule-making authority that 
exempts a small class of debt collectors from its authority, which may cause complications 
down the line. Specifically, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5517(a) states that the CFPB’s rule-making 
authority does not extend to debt collectors who collect on behalf of merchants that 
extend their goods or services to consumers on credit. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5517(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) 
(West 2011). The exemption is very narrow, however, and does not apply if the merchant 
extends credit beyond the value of the goods and services supplied, such as a store credit 
card, or if legal ownership of the debt is transferred to the debt collector, as is the case 
where the debt collector is a debt buyer. See id. § 5517(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). 
 234 Creating the Consumer Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http:// 
www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/creatingthebureau (last visited Feb. 6, 2011). 
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sections provide a few initial proposals that may help it 
effectuate an optimal regulatory framework.  
1. Standardization  
First, the CFPB should standardize statutory 
compliance by creating an optional set of forms that can be 
utilized by creditors to ensure that they fall within the more 
technical requirements of the FDCPA. In particular, the 
validation notification language should be standardized. This 
would alleviate some of the major inconsistencies that are 
occurring in different jurisdictions as Courts struggle to 
determine whether varying forms created by individual debt 
collectors comply with the provisions of the FDCPA. This would 
also help the CFPB achieve its goal of remediating “outdated, 
unnecessary, or unduly burdensome regulations,” and it would 
streamline the FDCPA to more precisely target substantive 
debt collection abuse.235 Overall, a set of standardized forms for 
FDCPA disclosures would alleviate ambiguity by reducing the 
technical compliance issues of the statute to one easily 
ascertainable analysis: Did the debt collector use the right form? 
This would not only ensure that consumers received debt 
notifications that are easy to understand and that comply with 
the FDCPA—it would also provide debt collectors with a 
tangible benefit in exchange for some of the additional burdens 
they might undertake while complying with new regulations. 
Finally, standardization may provide debt collectors with an 
increased incentive to arrange a modified payment plan directly 
with the consumer, and to reserve the use of legal process—a 
growing trend which has concerned the FTC236—as a last resort. 
2. Evolving Regulation of Emerging Technologies 
The bureau could also use its rulemaking authority to 
issue guidelines and regulations that finally address emerging 
forms of communication that did not exist at the time the 
FDCPA was initially enacted. It could provide the dynamic 
regulatory framework that is necessary for regulating the use 
of existing and emerging technologies in the debt collection 
industry—a change that the FTC has suggested is badly 
  
 235 12 U.S.C.A. § 5511(b) (West 2011). 
 236 See supra Part IV.B. 
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needed.237 These regulations should provide guidelines for debt 
collectors to contact consumers on their cell phones and 
answering machines. Also, forward-looking regulations should 
be crafted address the use of technologies such as e-mail, text 
messaging, and online social networking.  
Additionally, as other commentators have suggested, 
there are many unregulated technological advances already 
used by the debt collection industry that have the potential for 
abuse, such as outsourced collection calls, predictive auto 
dialers, and demographic profiling tools.238 Ultimately, the 
CFPB must promulgate regulations and guidelines that evolve 
with the sophistication of the entities it seeks to regulate.  
3. Dual Enforcement of the FDCPA: Interagency 
Cooperation with the FTC 
Finally, the CFPB must work in conjunction with the 
FTC to expand the government’s collective regulation efforts. 
The FTC is not required to yield its enforcement authority to the 
CFPB under the Consumer Financial Protection Act (as many 
other agencies are required to do);239 instead, the act provides 
that the CFPB and the FTC will have concurrent enforcement 
jurisdiction over the FDCPA.240 The act also requires the two 
agencies to coordinate and to openly share information 
regarding consumer complaints.241 While the creation of such a 
powerful overseeing body creates the potential for jurisdictional 
protectionism among agencies, more optimistically, there is the 
potential for regulatory synergy. The FTC has expertise 
regulating the FDCPA, but lacks rulemaking authority. The 
FTC should utilize the institutional knowledge that it has 
gained through years of data collection and targeted studies in 
order to draft proposed regulations, which could then be 
  
 237 See supra Part IV.B. 
 238 Demographic profiling tools have the ability to calculate a debtor’s likelihood 
of repayment based on factors such as race, sex and age. See Goldberg, supra note 40, at 
729-39; see also Linda Stern, A New Shakedown? Debt Collectors Resort to New Tactic, 
NEWSWEEK, July 21, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/2008/07/20/a-new-shakedown.html 
(discussing use of computer algorithms and profiling systems to grade debt). For a 
discussion about how debt collectors target elderly debtors due to their high statistical 
likelihood of repayment, see Matthew W. Ludwig, Abuse, Harassment, and Deception: 
How the FDCPA Is Failing America’s Eldery Debtors, 16 ELDER L.J. 135, 151-52 (2008). 
 239 12 U.S.C.A. § 5581(b) (West 2011). 
 240 Id. § 5581(b)(5)(C). It is noted, however, that the FTC would be required to 
defer to the CFPB in some situations. Id. § 5515(c)(1). 
 241 Id. §§ 5493(b)(3)(D), 5495. 
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reviewed and enacted by the CFPB. Since the CFPB now has the 
rulemaking authority necessary to promulgate binding 
regulations, collaboration between the FTC and the CFPB may 
provide the perfect marriage of institutional knowledge and 
administrative power necessary to improve the FDCPA.  
Additionally, since both agencies have the power to 
bring civil actions to enforce the FDCPA, the government 
should utilize its additional resources to expand its 
enforcement efforts in the coming years.242 The CFPB has even 
greater financial leverage over violators than does the FTC. 
While the FTC has the power to seek $16,000 in fines per 
knowing violation of the FDCPA,243 the CFPB can seek three 
distinct levels of monetary damages for violations of any of the 
consumer protection laws within its mandate.244 First, the CFPB 
can seek $5000 per violation of a consumer protection law, 
regardless of whether the offender knew of the violation.245 
Second, the CFPB can seek $25,000 per violation if the offender 
recklessly engaged in conduct that violated a consumer protection 
law.246 Finally, the CFPB has the authority to seek $1,000,000 per 
violation if an offender knowingly violates a consumer protection 
law.247 Accordingly, a restructured governmental enforcement 
effort could more effectively target substantive debt collection 
abuse as follows: first, the CFPB could handle a few of the largest 
FDCPA enforcement actions every year, similar to the current 
practice of the FTC; second, the FTC could broaden its 
enforcement efforts to target a larger number of small, yet 
prolifically abusive collectors who have avoided scrutiny in the 
past (with exponentially more enforcement cases the FTC’s 
increased presence would place positive pressure on the industry 
to self-monitor); and finally, both agencies could combine 
resources to better educate the consumers as to their rights under 
the FDCPA, which would make it more likely for abuses to be 
prosecuted through private consumer lawsuits. These increased 
efforts would collectively destroy the profit motive of debt 
collectors who engage in abusive practices. 
  
 242 From 1997 through 2008, the FTC brought fewer than seventy 
enforcement actions. FTC, THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE, supra note 15, app.B at B-1 to 
B-3 (listing enforcement actions from 1977 through 2008). 
 243 See supra Part I.B. 
 244 12 U.S.C.A. § 5565(c). 
 245 Id. § 5565(c)(2)(A). 
 246 Id. § 5565(c)(2)(B). 
 247 Id. § 5565(c)(2)(C). 
2011] THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 1597 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We live in a credit driven society during difficult financial 
times. Necessarily, an inextricable financial relationship exists 
between consumers and debt collectors. The two sides of this 
relationship are in constant tension, and there must always be a 
fair balance between the right of debtors to remain free of 
harassment, misrepresentation, and unfair treatment, and the 
right of creditors to pursue valid debts in good faith. The Court’s 
decision in Jerman clearly illustrates this tension, and 
regrettably, regardless of how the Court decided that case, the 
pendulum between creditor and consumer rights was destined to 
swing in one direction or another. 
It need not be a zero sum game. By revising and 
regulating the FDCPA in a way that enhances consumer rights 
with modern protections, while also providing ethical debt 
collectors with clearer guidance to legally pursue their debts, 
regulators will better protect consumers, and reward creditors 
who act in good faith by adhering to the requirements of the 
statute. Finally, an improved FDCPA that provides increased 
financial incentives to punish substantive violators while 
improving, regulating, and standardizing the lines of 
communication between debt collectors and debtors will help 
contribute to a more efficient credit market and will lead to 
better outcomes for all parties involved.  
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